*The investigation was published in the Efimerida ton Syntakton newspaper on Friday, August 8, 2025.

Investigation: Ioanna Louloudi, Nikos Morfonios – MIIR ,Mohammad Bassiki – SIRAJ, Sofia Turati, Lorenzo Di Stasi
Illustrations: Konstantina Maltepioti 

George Hallack in London for Air Mediterranean’s maiden flight, November 2, 2017. – Source: Air Mediterranean

In 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, flights were reduced, but other opportunities opened up. Such as the International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVRR) program, co-financed by EU and national funds. On August 6 2020, the airline undertook the operation of a charter flight that would implement the voluntary return to Iraq of 134 migrants of Iraqi nationality, under the auspices of the Ministry of Μigration. An IOM spokesperson confirmed that the international organisation coordinated the operation and the competitive bidding process, which Air Mediterranean had won. It also added that “this remains the only AVRR flight conducted with that airline”. In 2024, however, the company conducted eight similar voluntary return flights from Italy to Tunisia, in agreement with the Italian Ministry for Internal Affairs. 

According to data collected from Flightradar24, the airline had operated 18 flights between Damascus and Benghazi from May until July 2023, and 52 flights from Benghazi to Athens (but not vice versa) between December 2022-July 2023. 

It remains unclear exactly which passengers it served and how the company could guarantee that it would not carry “individuals who collaborated with the Syrian regime or were on the US sanctions list”, as assured by operations director Marios Samprakos, since it needed the Assad government’s permission to operate in Syria. It also remains unknown what guarantees were in place for the safety of flights in Syrian and Libyan airspace.

Mohamad Majd Deiry (left, in white) on the runway at Damascus International Airport, after the arrival of the Air Mediterranean flight from Athens on June 30, 2025 – Source: Syrian Civil Aviation Authority

Roaming like free birds

Air Mediterranean’s flights to Syria were suspended in October 2023, shortly before the EU sanctions on Al-Daj and his companies came into effect in January 2024. The flights to Damascus resumed a month ago and are currently continuing through another agency, Almera Travel & Tourism. 

Deiry, the FBI fugitive weapons smuggler, is making public appearances in Damascus in the new political and social landscape now taking shape in the country.

The Hallak civil war is still raging. The Red Notice issued for George and Andrew Hallak has not been enforced.

What Greek and European authorities are doing to ensure that the Greek carrier and its partners, as well as other airline companies stay out of illegal activities, and that the safety of passengers is not compromised, remains unclear. 

As for the convicted Mahmoud Al-Daj, little is known about his activities after the fall of the Assad regime, except for a single Facebook post from 31 December 2024. In it, Al-Daj boasts about the arrival of the first ship at the port of Latakia loaded with cars and buses. “A new achievement that embodies our vision and ambition… for the year 2025”, he wrote, an indication of his intention to continue doing business in Syria. He later deleted the post.

His whereabouts remain unknown. 

*This investigation was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe. 

It has been published in MIIR (Greece), SIRAJ (Syria), DARAJ (Lebanon), Voxeurop (France) and l’Espresso (Italy). The report was first published in “Efimerida ton Syntakton” newspaper on August 2, 2025.

*Before the publication of this investigation, several requests for reply and clarifications were sent to Air Mediterranean and George and Andreas Hallak, but all remained unanswered. After the investigation was first published in Greece, MIIR and EfSyn received a judicial warning from Air Mediterranean and George and Andreas Hallak, who deny any connection with Mohamad Majd Deiry, reject the accusations of fraud and embezzlement in the Libank affair, and admit to their collaboration with Mahmoud Al-Daj. We will publish these judicial warnings, as well as our response, in the coming days.

**On August 6th, following the initial publication of the investigation, the Hellenic Police sent us data listing arrests made at Athens Eleftherios Venizelos Airport, for illegal entry into the country with the use of forged/altered documents from Arab and African countries of departure during the year 2023,  along with the airlines used to arrive in Greece. The data mentions 8 arrests involving Syria as the country of departure. However, in the table recording these 8 arrests, the airline the arrested passengers flew with from Syria is listed as “Unknown” in 7 of the cases – a designation not found for any other country – while the remaining entry is left blank. We requested clarifications from the Hellenic Police as to why this specific information was omitted, but we have not received a response to date. 

“Nature is blamed for failings that are man’s
and well-run rivers have to change their plans”
Sir Alan Patrick Herbert, novelist (1890-1971)

“The flood has changed our lives. My children are scared every time it rains. My son had a panic attack when the bridges in Faenza were closed recently, because he thought the same thing would happen. And I can’t help but look at the river every time I drive by. I live from day to day now. Everything can change in an instant. You know, I lost everything in half an hour”. Francesca Placci, 42, a cook, lives in the Italian city of Faenza, in the province of Ravenna, in Emilia-Romagna. Faenza, located 50 kilometres south-east of Bologna, was flooded three times in 18 months during the 2023-2024 biennium.

As in Thessaly and Valencia, the inhabitants of this Italian city are still living with fear and anxiety about the future after this triple shock.  “Every time it rains, I am afraid. Our confidence is gone. We no longer know what we can rely on. This place is not safe. Nothing will ever be the same again. My husband is more tired now, more silent. In our community we continue to help each other, but the state has never been there for us. Instead, all we got was a mess of bureaucracy and crumbs of financial support. We have learned to rely only on ourselves and the people around us,” says Simona Bacchilega, 54.

Her voice echoes and joins those of the inhabitants of Palamas Karditsa, Mandra, Volos and Pelion, the neighbourhoods of Valencia in Spain, the Danube regions of Hungary and Slovakia, in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Saarland in Germany, in the provinces of Karlovac and Sisk-Moslavina in Croatia and in dozens of other affected areas.

Thessaly, September 2023, photo: Marios Lolos 

The deadliest natural disaster

Floods are the most common natural disaster. They account for 44% of all natural disasters worldwide and cause almost half of all deaths. Today, 1.81 billion people (23% of the world’s population) are considered to be directly exposed to the risk of severe flooding. Their frequency has more than doubled since 2004, scientists say, due to the acceleration of the hydrological cycle caused by anthropogenic climate change. 

Over the past 30 years, floods in Europe have affected 5.5 million people, caused more than 3,000 deaths and resulted in economic losses of more than €170 billion. But these are just journalistic estimates.

How many people have actually died in floods in each region of Europe over the last decade? How many and which specific areas in each country and region have been affected, and which infrastructure has been hit hardest, especially in the last two years? And how can we protect ourselves effectively? The publicly available scientific data on floods in Europe is fragmentary, incomplete and uninformative.

MIIR’s month-long cross-border journalistic data research – unique in Europe – as part of EDJNET, has managed to combine data from three different open databases to create the first comprehensive pan-European database on floods, recording the number of floods, flood victims and flood deaths in all European regions from 2014 to 2024. 

In addition, we have created a separate database based on satellite data for the last two years (2023-2024), which accurately records the extent of flooding and its impact on land and infrastructure in all European regions of 17 Member States.

The devastating impact in numbers

Between 2014 and 2024, data collected by Copernicus, the EM-DAT public database and the Hanze database show that at least 681,076 people were affected by floods in 24 European countries. However, the actual number of people affected is higher as data is not available for all floods. 

Based on the existing data we have analysed, at least 1,579 people have died directly as a result of floods in Europe over the last decade.

Together with Michalis Diakakis, a hydrogeologist and assistant professor at the University of Athens, they study flood fatalities in Europe, having contributed to the most reliable (because it includes all events with at least one fatality) large-scale database on flood fatalities in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Flood Fatalities from the Euro-Mediterranean region FFEM-DB). The number of deaths in 14 Euro-Mediterranean countries over the last 35 years exceeds 3000.

Excess mortality

The official death toll in Thessaly in 2023 was 17. However, a recent study by the Centre for Research and Training in Public Health, Health Policy and Primary Health Care, published by the Greek daily Efsyn. (“Plains mourns 335 dead, not 17 from Daniel”, 16.3.2025), shows that the actual total number of deaths was 20 times higher in the first quarter after the floods. In total, 335 people died within three months, mostly from cardiovascular and/or respiratory problems. 

As noted by meteo.gr (K. Papagiannaki, K. Lagovardos, G. Kyros, 18/10/2024), in the last 45 years Greece has experienced 70 deadly floods due to heavy rainfall, resulting in 190 deaths. There is an alarming trend: the number of deaths caused by floods is increasing over time. In the last decade, for example, half of all recorded deaths have occurred in the last 45 years. 

According to the Institute for Environmental Research and Sustainable Development of the National Observatory of Athens, in the Balkans as a whole, floods with more than 10 fatalities occur every 6.5 years, while floods with more than 22 fatalities occur every 12 years.

Our research shows that in the last two years, 17 European countries have experienced 32 floods, affecting a total of 427.336,2 hectares – an area 1.5 times the size of Luxembourg – according to satellite data from Copernicus Emergency Management Mapping. 

The area flooded in Europe over the past two years is almost twice the size of Greater London and larger than Rome, Paris and Berlin combined.

Analysis of the 61 affected areas shows that provincial areas suffered the most extensive flooding, with some 138.663 hectares flooded. Similarly, 98.447 hectares were affected in intermediate (semi-urban) areas and 88.468 hectares in urban areas.

Thessaly, September 2023, photo: Marios Lolos 

The largest flood in Europe in the last two years started on 5 September 2023 in the Thessaly region of Greece, affecting almost 1,223,750 hectares, of which 92% was agricultural land. The storm directly claimed the lives of 17 people, affected 44,000 inhabitants in Karditsa, Trikala, Magnesia and Larissa and resulted in the death of more than 200,000 animals.

The actual extent of the flood in Thessaly

Until now, the area flooded in Thessaly seemed to be less than 1 million hectares (72.000 hectares was the first official report from the Athens Observatory), but our analysis shows that the actual extent of the disaster is much greater than what has been reported in the press (up to 80.000 hectares).

It turns out that the total area affected in the whole of Thessaly was 122.374,7 hectares, which is more than 50% more than the initial estimates). This is because our measurement includes the ‘flood footprint’ recorded by the Copernicus satellites – areas where water was present but had receded by the time the satellite image was taken. As Copernicus told MIIR, “we assume with a very high probability that a flood has occurred where traces of it are detected in the satellite images”.

 Snapshot from the Copernicus website, showing the diagonal lines of the Thessaly flood track on 9 September 2023. Retrieved 25.3.2025.

Our data shows that Thessaly also experienced the most significant damage to the transport network in the whole of Europe over the last two years, with 1,590 km of roads and almost 149 km of rail infrastructure damaged. 

Germany has been the worst performer in Europe in this category over the last two years, with 209.8 km of long-distance power lines and cables and 117.7 km of local power lines and cables affected.

Flooding of the Saar River, Saarland Germany, 18.05.2024. Source: Berit Kessler / Shutterstock.com

Flooding in Valencia, Dana, October 2024. Source: Guillermo Gutiérrez Carrascal / El Confidencial.

These data show that inland floods at municipal and provincial level, often caused by heavy rainfall, overflowing rivers or poor drainage, have affected a larger area than coastal floods.

However, areas close to the water appear to be more vulnerable to flooding, with the majority of floods in a decade occurring in coastal areas, particularly in Spain, France and Italy.

As was shown for the floods in a parallel investigation by the Spanish El Confidencial, the areas most affected in Valencia have lower levels of income per capita and, at the same time, the houses built there, where land is cheaper, are less prepared to cope with this type of event. The five Spanish provinces with the highest number of buildings in flood-prone areas at risk of flooding are, in order, Murcia, Seville, Valencia, Alicante and Tarragona. 

Flooding in Valencia, Dana, October 2024. Source: Guillermo Gutiérrez Carrascal / El Confidencial.

The last three and a half decades have been among the most flood-rich periods in Europe in the last 500 years. Scientists have shown (Current European flood-rich period exceptional compared with past 500 years, Nature, 2000) that this period differs from other similar flood-rich periods in terms of magnitude, air and sea temperatures and seasonality. The summer of 2024 was the warmest ever recorded in Europe and worldwide. Note that for each additional degree Celsius of global average temperature, the intensity of precipitation increases by about 7%.

The biggest problem is that sea temperatures in the Mediterranean have risen. The critical limit is a water temperature of 26 degrees Celsius. “When this is exceeded, the meteorological system that passes over an area is enriched with enormous additional moisture, and all this acts as both an accelerator and a magnifier of the phenomenon,” explains Professor Nikitas Mylopoulos, a professor at the University of Thessaly. 

Such a condition leads to the famous Omega cyclones, as happened with Daniel in Thessaly. “In the same region, two phenomena that are supposed to occur every 500 and 1000 years have occurred in just three years. This automatically means that all the alarm bells have to go off, because the return periods change, all the statistical distributions change and, of course, the whole way of coping and planning changes”.

 “Governments insist on dealing only with the day after the disaster (post disaster), instead of taking preventive measures (risk-cost benefit). Between 2017-2021, Greece was given about €100 million in flood compensation alone. Only for Janus (a Mediterranean cyclone that hit the Mediterranean and mainly Greece in September 2020), 38 million euros were given, 7 million euros in state compensation and 31 million euros in insurance compensation,” notes Katerina Papagiannaki, a scientist at the National Observatory of Athens. 

The same is said by Nikitas Mylopoulos, professor at the University of Thessaly, director of the Laboratory of Hydrology and Analysis of Water Systems, making it clear that the only way to deal with the situation is to draw up a Holistic Flood Protection Plan with a series of projects that will “cooperate” with each other. 

Smart dams

“Flood management is very important,” says Mylopoulos. “It relates to how we with our projects will direct, guide the flood volumes as safely as possible to avoid major disasters. This is done first of all with the mountain hydrology projects: small earthen dams high up in the mountains, where the phenomenon starts, in the small streams. So that’s where you put the first stop. Second needed, smaller small and medium-sized dams and dikes downstream. And not the pharaonic big dams. Small dams, but set up smartly, in the areas that actually do the job. Thirdly, reforestation is needed throughout the region, and enhancing natural protection, vegetation cover is crucial in flood mitigation. And, of course, we must finally provide for flood zones, according to their risk, which are usually currently either built-up areas or fields of intensive farming. These zones must be returned with lighter land uses. The rivers must be given back their old meanderings, which play a role in reducing the risk. 

Θεσσαλία, Σεπτέμβριος 2023, κακοκαιρία Daniel, φωτό: Μάριος Λώλος 

Simona Bacchilega, a worker in the municipality of Faenza, on the evening of 16 May 2023 was receiving messages from friends to leave her home. 

“We lived in the centre of the city, ten metres above the surface of the river, and we weren’t worried. We didn’t think the sewers could overflow. Until the moment we heard a strange sound coming from the bathroom and there was a terrible stench. Suddenly we saw water coming from the yard, despite the sandbags my husband and neighbor had placed. The water was coming in non-stop. I quickly grabbed a backpack, put in clothes, a flashlight, water. We went out into the street. I realized that my water was reaching my waist.We spent the entire first night awake, sitting in the dark. The power had been out since 9 o’clock at night. Looking outside, I could see the water rising in my car. “Not the car,” I thought. “I just unloaded it!”

The river will take it all away’

“I was thinking of my aunt who used to tell us, ‘The river will take it all away’,” Simona recalls. “The elderly neighbor across the street was talking to us from his window. His wife was on dialysis, and all night long we exchanged glances. He was a professor, a great man. He lost his entire library. I used to watch him look at his books in the water. The next day helicopters were flying all the time, and we didn’t know what was happening.”

For a while they stayed with some neighbors. “When we were able to return home, we realized we had to fend for ourselves. No one helped us. If you wanted water, you had to find it yourself. Volunteers and organized help never reached our area. Then we started to clean up.” 18 months later, in September 2024, Faenza, like dozens of areas in central Europe, was flooded again by the Boris storm.

Satellite image of the Italian city of Faenza from ​ESA/NASA, May 2023

That same night, 42-year-old cook Francesca Placci lost what she had painstakingly built over a lifetime. “My apartment was completely submerged, the water reached up to 3 cm from the ceiling,” she says.

Raffaela Paladini, an expert in trauma management after a disaster, visited Faenza as an “emergency psychologist” providing assistance to dozens of people. “Such a situation certainly has a traumatic impact. People who go about their daily lives as we all do, at some point in time find themselves in an emergency situation faced with something that disrupts their daily routine. This interruption initially causes confusion, a sense of disorientation, emptiness and despair. It can then trigger very different emotions, such as anger, rage and guilt.”

Flood in Faenza, Italy, 17 May 2023. Source: Dario Argenti / Shutterstock.com

“We are financially exhausted. Everything needed to be replaced. The frustration was growing as there was no government support. I spent months looking for help, knocking on doors of public services, but in vain. But the worst part was the psychological impact. Every time it rained, I had an anxiety attack. I couldn’t sleep, waking up in the middle of the night to check if the river had swollen again. My mother, who was always strong, began to show signs of dementia. She was no longer the same.”

And for 66-year-old retiree Mirella Emiliani, everything has changed. “I used to pay attention to appearance, I had nice clothes, an organized home. Now, I have nothing. I don’t even have my old photos. The flood has changed my relationships with people. My few real friends did everything they could to help me. Others just disappeared. When it rains, I’m still scared. I think I can’t go through the same thing again. No one warned us in time. Nothing was done right. Now, I live day by day, because I learned that life can change in an instant.” 

However, all the affected people say almost the same thing: “this disaster has changed me, but it has also highlighted the power of solidarity”. Andrea Bazzocchi returned home after 1.5 years of suffering. “We are trying to rebuild our lives, step by step; this experience has taught us a lot, but we cannot live in fear. We move forward with optimism.”

The cross-border data research was organised and coordinated by the Mediterranean Institute for Investigative Reporting (MIIR.gr) in the framework of the European Data Journalism Network (EDJNet).

The data collection, analysis and visualization was carried out by Konstantina Maltepioti. The data analysis was checked by the Deutsche Welle team. The illustrations were created by Louisa Karageorgiou.

A total of 6 EDJNet members participated in the survey, which was conducted from November 2024 to March 2025: MIIR (Greece), Atlatszo (Hungary), Facta (Italy), El Confidencial, Civio (Spain), PressOne (Romania).

The survey was published on 29 March 2025 in www.miir.gr and www.efsyn.gr. 

See the scrollytelling of the survey here.
Read the methodology of the survey here.

Authors: Janine Louloudi, Kostas Zafeiropoulos, Nikos Morfonios (MIIR)

Data Analysis – Visualizations:  Konstantina Maltepioti 

Illustration: Louiza Karageorgiou

“Mommy, he told me he’s going to cut my throat…”

“Mommy, Mommy, Mommy I’m dying!“. Salamina, Friday night, December 1, 2023. 74-year-old Evangelia hears her 43-year-old daughter, Georgia Poutou, on the other end of the phone line, pleading for help. She quickly realises that her daughter has once again been beaten up by her partner. From her home she calls the police to send a patrol car, but her plea falls on deaf ears. 

Finally, she herself rushes to her daughter’s house. When she arrives, she sees Georgia lying outside in the garden of the house, bleeding. The woman cannot walk, her ankle is broken and her knees are badly knocked out. The perpetrator is nowhere to be found. The battered woman, along with her mother and her 15-year-old son – a disabled child – set off for the island’s police station.

The policemen there won’t take a statement: ‘Go to the health centre, bring the doctors’ report and then come back to press charges’, they say. No mobilization takes place to arrest the violent offender, no concern for the victim. 

The next day the physically abused woman herself insists on going to the police, even though her mother discourages her, fearing the worst. “Mommy, he said he’s going to cut my throat”, Georgia replies, as her devastated mother tells MIIR. The same fear pushes Georgia to seek protection. It was not her first savage beating by her 71-year-old partner, who has reportedly been convicted of assaulting another woman in the past – not that this has any restraining effect. 

At the station she finds other police officers who finally take her statement, advising her not to stay in her house and placing the “panic button” app on her phone, so that she can call for help if she needs it. It wasn’t enough.  

Three days later, on the morning of December 5, Georgia falls dead. Her abuser sought her out at her mother’s house where she had taken refuge. He shot her twice with a shotgun through the glass of the front-door, fatally wounding her in the abdomen and chest. The assailant was arrested but it was too late. Georgia was the 12th femicide victim for 2023 in Greece.

Femicides without end in Greece and Europe 

There is no official record of femicide in Greece, and the government insists that there is no reason to make femicide an crime in its own right. This is despite the fact that the number of women murdered or subjected to violence by men remains extremely high in the country. The consolidation of violence against women both in Greece and in Europe is reflected in the cross-border data investigation conducted for a second year by the Mediterranean Institute of Investigative Journalism (MIIR) together with 14 other European journalism organisations in the context of the European Data Journalism Network (EDJNet). 

For the needs of the investigation and in order to address the pan-European lack of comparable data on violence against women, the participating teams sought and contributed as up-to-date data as possible through requests to the relevant authorities in each country for the period 2014-2023. Data were analysed based on two primary sources: the reports of the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE – provided data up to 2018) and EUROSTAT (data up to 2021). EIGE focuses on indicators measuring intimate partner violence, rape and femicide, while Eurostat focuses on intentional homicides, paying particular attention to the victim-offender relationship (partner or family member). It should be noted that EIGE considers this definition of intentional homicide by a partner or relative to be the closest to femicide. In our analysis we only included data that we were confident were consistent with EIGE standards.

By counting femicides based on data analysed to EIGE standards, we estimate at least 4221 victims in Europe between 2012-2022 (comparable data for Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Romania are not available and not all countries have data for every year). 

If anything, the above figure gives evidence of underreporting of femicide by police authorities. This is because Eurostat’s crime statistics show that in Europe, in a total of 27 countries, 14143 intentional homicides of women happened in the same decade (regardless of the perpetrator). Of these, based on available data we analysed (for 19 countries), at least 6806 are intentional homicides of women by current/former partners (4334) and family members (2472). One realises that if there is more diligence in data collection and proper recording of the victim-perpetrator relationship by the police, then the resulting number of femicides could prove to be truly staggering.

According to the most updated figures we received from the Hellenic Police, the number of female victims of intentional homicides by male partners in 2024 was already 5 until February 29th. 

Based on the most recently released femicide data for 2022 (EIGE standards), Greece saw a 4.3% increase compared to 2021, from 23 to 24 victims, confirming that at least 2 women per month died at the hands of a partner and/or someone in their domestic environment. Germany also showed a significant increase (22%). France and Italy had a decrease of 3.3% and 12.9% respectively compared to 2021, but still have a significantly high number of female victims of femicide (118 and 61 victims respectively in 2022). On the other hand, Slovakia and Cyprus – which remains the only EU country where femicide is recognised as a specific crime as of 2022 – saw a large decrease 50% and 60% respectively.  

In terms of the highest increases for the decade 2012 to 2022, data analysed by EIGE standards show that Greece had the highest increase in femicides in 2021 with an increase of 155.6% to 23 femicides compared to 9 in 2020 (note: in last year’s report the number of victims for 2020 was estimated as 8 by police). The second highest number is in Sweden, which saw a 120% increase in 2018 (22 femicides) compared to 2017 (10), followed by Slovakia, which saw a 66.7% increase in 2020, and Croatia with 28.6% compared to 2019.

Based on newly available data for 2021, the European average number for femicides by intimate partners (EIGE) per 100.000 women (based on the 10 countries that provided data) is 0.39, a figure that corresponds to almost 4 women per million. Based on Eurostat, the average number of intentional female homicides by an intimate partner in 2021 for the exact same countries as EIGE is 2.4 per 100.000 women, a number that is lower than the official data we collected from national authorities for these countries, which could be indicative of how femicides are not correctly reported to Eurostat.

Unofficial sources are better at monitoring

For the purposes of the investigation the participating teams also collected data from unofficial sources, such as local monitoring groups for the recording of femicides. Such organizations mostly monitor media coverage with the aim of countering the underreporting of violence against women. This choice was made in order to compare the official number of femicides with the unofficial one.

This method also allows us to gain insight into countries such as Belgium that does not have any recent data in the Eurostat or Eige databases. However non-official sources estimate 101 femicides took place from 2020 to 2023 (source: “Stop Feminicide Belgie”). Significantly higher numbers of femicides compared to official sources are estimated for recent years by non-official sources in Italy, France and Spain.

Violence of all forms against women in Greece is on the rise

Femicides are often the last and irreversible stage in a process of escalating violence from the perpetrators to the victim, as the recent case in Salamina has proved. For the data investigation we analysed other indicators relating to physical, psychological, economic and sexual violence in order to highlight the variation in the number of women victims of each form of violence in recent years across Europe.

In terms of physical and sexual violence, in Greece the pandemic period was characterized by a frightening increase (110.2%) in victims of physical violence in 2020 (3609 women) and 70.9% in 2021 (6166 women), while victims of sexual violence had increased in the same two-year period from 69 to 147. The evolution of the phenomenon is even more disheartening for 2022, where a 20.5% increase in physical violence was recorded with 7430 victims, and an explosion in sexual violence (268.7%) with 542 female victims. 

In contrast, Cyprus -in the year when it legally ratified femicide- saw a 9% decrease in physical violence incidents with 1752 victims in 2022 from 1925 in 2021, when it had seen a 78.9% increase in physical violence incidents compared to 2020 (1076 victims).

“Data-collection systems across the EU member States remain very heterogeneous, as they are grounded in national crime statistics or other administrative data sources on homicide (from the judiciary or health system) or from non-governmental organisations’ media analysis. Therefore, data is not comparable, making measurement across member states currently not possible”, explains Cristina Fabre Rosell who works as Gender-based Violence Team Leader at the European Institute for Gender Equality, adding that gender-based violent crimes remain under-reported. This makes tackling violence against women and developing policies that reinforce gender equality problematic. The Gender Equality Index for 2023 is indicative of this, as countries such as Greece, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania that are at the bottom of the list, do seem to have problems in addressing violence against women.

When it comes to economic violence against women in Europe (this is the suffocating financial control or financial bleeding that a man may exert towards his current or former partner), based on available data (2019-2022), four countries show decreases in victims: Serbia, Germany, Croatia and Slovakia. Greece had no data available at all before 2021, but in 2022, 1626 women victims of economic violence were recorded for the first time in our country.

Moreover, as revealed by the investigation, there is a remarkable Europe-wide increase in the appeal for help from victims of domestic violence or third parties to national support lines, such as the “SOS 15900 Line” in Greece. For 2022, the largest increases are found in Spain (21.51%), Greece (17.28%) and Ireland (19.66%). However, in 2023 in Greece, unlike other countries, a decrease (-21.62%) was observed (-21.62%), without knowing whether this is related to fewer incidents of violence or a tendency to avoid calling for help on the part of women. 

The area that most reveals the plight of women in Europe, and the one that causes the greatest political tension, is that of rape.  

In Greece, rapes increased by 34.1% in 2022 (from 226 to 303 women) and 79.4% in 2021. Police data for 2023 indicates towards a consolidation of the high number of victims (294 women).  

Spain recorded a significant increase in rapes in 2022 (140.7%), while the Czech Republic had a large increase in both years (25.9% in 2021, 11.1% in 2022). Slovakia (7.5%), Croatia (11.3%), Cyprus (5.6%), Ireland (3.2%) and Romania (2%) also recorded an increase in rapes in 2022. 

Apart from the extent of the phenomenon, we also analysed the evolution in the penal treatment of perpetrators of rape and sexual assault over time.

Rape as a field of confrontation

The issue of rape has significantly divided the European Union, as shown by the recent negotiations to reach an agreement across member states on the new EU Directive on combatting violence against women and domestic violence, initially proposed two years ago.

On February 6, a provisional agreement was finally reached between the European Parliament and Council on EU-wide rules to combat gender-based violence and protect its victims, especially women and victims of domestic violence. It includes minimum standard rules on the protection of women victims of violence, criminalisation of certain forms of gender-based violence, tougher rules on cyber violence, better access to justice, protection and prevention, as well as establishing enhanced reporting and evidence gathering by authorities.

However, the adoption of a controversial article on rape (Article 5), which would have made any sexual act without consent a criminal offence, was not achieved.

Patriarchy

“Firstly, it is a directive covering many criminal law aspects so negotiations took more time. Secondly working on women’s rights is always difficult because of patriarchal structures that are still guiding our societies unfortunately. The main obstacle was to get consent based rape legislation included which we did not manage to get in the end. There was a lot of resistance from several member states to this even though rape is the most widespread and serious form of gender based violence”, explains Swedish MEP Evin Incir (S&D), who is the European Parliament’s co-chief rapporteur on gender-based violence in the committee on civil liberties (LIBE).

In an interview with MIIR, MEP Incir added that “the concept of ‘rape’ is highly debated due to deep-rooted patriarchal norms in society. It’s challenging to reach an agreement that defines sex without consent as rape, as outlined in the Istanbul Convention. However, we’re optimistic that our recent negotiation success in including a provision on preventing rape based on lack of consent, will prompt a shift in societal attitudes across Europe. This, in turn, could generate the necessary pressure for national governments to update their legal definitions to align with international human rights standards, such as those set forth in the Istanbul Convention. Looking ahead, we anticipate the European Commission to propose new legislation specifically addressing rape, building upon this progress”.

The far right (also) threatens women

MEP Incir explains that the significance of the Directive “is further underscored by the looming threat of a right-wing surge in the EU, emphasizing the imperative for such protective measures. While it may not meet all our aspirations, this directive sets a foundational standard and serves as a starting point for progress, reinforcing the commitment to never regress on these critical advancements”.

This concern about the changing political and social environment in Europe in relation to the increase in violence against women is also expressed by Cristina Fabre Rosell, EIGE’s Gender-based Violence Team Leader, who told MIIR that “Two years after the Covid pandemic we don’t know if it’s still because of it, or because extreme forms of violence against women have increased due to different causes that are also related to the increase of the far right movements and the anti-gender narrative. We need to do more research on this, for me rape is a burning form of violence that demands our attentionFirst and foremost we must work towards better prevention”.

The missed opportunity in Greece

The Directive is expected to be formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council and then,  in the near future, enter into force. Member states will then have three years to implement it. In Greece an attempt to regulate prevention and combatting domestic violence against women came with the recent bill of the Ministry of Justice, which was voted in parliament with rapid procedures, focusing on the tightening of penalties for domestic violence. 

Significant organisations and collectives (European Anti-Violence Network, Diotima Centre, Mov, etc.) denounced the fact that their comments in the consultation process before the bill was passed were not taken into account. Most importantly, they denounced the introduction of amendments to the draft law which did not take into account the urgent recommendations of the GREVIO Committee (the independent authority monitoring the implementation of the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention) to the Greek government, as reflected in the first evaluation report delivered to the Greek authorities last November.

Among GREVIO’s recommendations is the need for the Greek authorities to:

• Significantly strengthen the coordination of the response to the needs of women victims of all forms of violence.
• Support and further develop the network of specialised support services and adequately address the needs of all women victims of all forms of violence. 
• Expand the number and capacity of shelters for women victims of violence throughout the country – currently there are only 20 shelters for women victims of violence, with a total capacity of around 450 individual beds.
• Ensure that accommodation is available to women in emergency situations.
• Ensure that women victims of violence have adequate access to social services that meet their needs and facilitate their recovery from violence.
• Move forward with the establishment of rape crisis centres and/or sexual violence referral centres that provide immediate medical care, trauma support, forensic examinations and immediate, short- and long-term psychological support.

Dr Kiki Petroulaki, psychologist and chair of the Board of the European Ant-Violence Network, explains that apart from the significant gaps in the protection of victims of abuse, the bill does not clarify the concept of consent in the definition of Rape, and it does not state that any sexual act or behaviour must be the product of free will. Thus lewd acts may be tried as misdemeanors. 

There is also no provision in the new law for speeding up procedures and to prioritise trials for domestic violence incidents, although since November 2021, a circular issued by the Supreme Court prosecutor, Vasilis Pliotas, called on prosecutors to intervene imminently, to further the process of arresting the presumed perpetrators of such crimes and for the related criminal cases to be heard as a matter of priority in court, so as to avoid all delays in delivering justice. In fact, the circular explicitly mentioned the term “femicide” – the first time a senior prosecutor had made an argument for the legal adoption of the term in Greece – and also called for victims of domestic violence to be supported when reporting violent behaviour against them.

Impunity

For the needs of the data investigation we tried to estimate the proportion of male offenders who are prosecuted for violence against women and end up in prison. 

Based on our analysis, Greece has an extremely low and disproportionate conviction rate for domestic violence perpetrators compared to the number of prosecutions. In 2017 the conviction rate was 2.9%, in 2018 it was 2% and in 2019 it was 1.9%. In 2021 the rate increased to 3.2%. This means that just 3 in 100 men who are criminally prosecuted, are then convicted to imprisonment. The Greek authorities did not offer data for 2022.

It is worth noting that the absolute figures may not fully reflect the situation in the reference year and that there may be anomalies in the data. For example, the registration of an offender in 2020 does not mean that the offense was committed in 2020, and similarly the imprisonment of an offender in 2020 does not mean that he committed the offense in the same year. For this reason, these rates are a relative estimate of the relationship between prosecutions and imprisonment of perpetrators of crimes of violence against women, recorded in a given time period, and should be interpreted as an indicator of a trend.

“I don’t think that manifestations of violence against women should be misdemeanours. Criminalisation is a way of dealing with violence. But criminalisation without prevention doesn’t work. We can’t rely on tightening penalties without prevention measures. This can have the opposite effect, such as increasing hatred against women. This is not the way to change attitudes, we see it with femicide, where harsh penalties do not prevent men from killing women”, says EIGE’s Cristina Fabre Rosell,  adding that member states need to invest in cross-sectoral cooperation between competent authorities.

Secondary victimisation 

Τhe communication gap between the relevant agencies, according to Dr Petroulaki, leaves women completely unprotected and vulnerable to secondary victimisation in a lengthy criminal procedure, which, she points out, is not monitored over time in its entirety. “Even if a restraining order has been granted, who monitors its implementation and what happens if it is violated? No one and nothing”, she states. This in turn exacerbates the feeling of impunity among perpetrators, who repeat and escalate the pattern of violence and, as the data shows, even go as far as femicide. 

This is the same impunity that armed the hand of the murderer of 43-year-old Georgia last December in Salamina. 

One of the last photos posted by Georgia Poutou on Facebook 6 days before the murder

Research – Text: Janine Louloudi, Maria Álvarez Del Vayo, Lucas Laursen, Ter García, Carmen Torrecillas, Adrian Maqueda
Data analysis – Illustrations: Civio 

At the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, the new occupant of the ministerial office presented his credentials a week ago. And it was exactly what anyone familiar with Makis Voridis’ path in the far-right, would expect. Appearing at the House Committee on Public Administration, Public Order and Justice (19/3), he was quick to announce that he personally made the decision to withdraw the provision of a bill that extended until the end of September the deadline for submitting applications for legalization of immigrants who have lived in Greece for more than three years and have found an employer (Article 205, para. 2) – a procedure that had been proposed by his predecessor Dimitris Kairidis, in an attempt to meet the pressing need for a workforce. He then announced that any further decision “should be linked to more restrictive policies to deal with illegal immigration from now on”. A few days later (27/3) during a visit to the ministry, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis would additionally state that legal immigration to Greece “must meet established labour market needs”.

Residence permits, initially temporary and then long-term, are the basic “paper” for proving legal residence in the country and the first step in the long process towards acquiring Greek citizenship for those foreigners who do not possess significant athletic or other qualifications to “offer exceptional services or serve an exceptional interest in the country” (Article 13 of the Code of Greek Citizenship), in order to receive honorary naturalization. Such naturalizations vary considerably, are usually quick and depend only on the political will of the government.

A very characteristic example is that of athletes who were naturalized in order to wear the colours of the Hellenic National Team, such as for example the Olympiakos basketball player Thomas Walkup, who received Greek citizenship in 2023 and participated with the Greek team in the 2024 Olympics. At least 25 athletes competed in Paris having received citizenship by decree of a European country, including Ekaterina Antropova, a Russian volleyball player naturalized by Italy in 2023, and Russian wrestler Dauren Kurugliev who gave Greece a silver medal.

However for people like Natalia, who has been living in Greece for the last 28 years, acquiring citizenship still seems like an elusive dream. She and her husband left Moldova in 1997, when the country was in a severe economic crisis, leaving behind two children. They both worked hard – she as a cleaner and housekeeper, her husband as a handyman –  and managed to bring over and raise their daughters here. The years went by, constantly renewing their residence permits, until in 2014 Natalia heard her daughters say, “Mom, we have our friends here, our studies here, we’re not going back.” It was around the time when the girls went to university, obtained Greek citizenship and encouraged her to apply for Greek citizenship.

“Citizenship unlocks the rights that individuals should have as full members in a state,” says migration researcher Jelena Dzankic, co-director of the Global Citizenship Observatory and a part-time professor at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy.

However, European countries only naturalise a small proportion of their foreign residents each year. According to the latest available figures, in 2022 the European Union, with a population of 448.4 million people, had naturalised less than 1 million people. In total, European countries host 41.2 million foreigners. Sweden naturalised the most in relation to its total population, followed by the Netherlands and Italy. Austria, Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, naturalised the smallest proportion. Most citizenship decisions in European countries in 2022 concerned immigrants from Morocco, Syria and Albania.

The prohibitive terms

Among the factors influencing naturalisation rates, the terms requested by states for people to obtain citizenship play an important role. Firstly, the documentation of the total number of years of legal residence, ranging up to 10 years in Spain, Austria and Italy and 7 years in Greece.

At the same time, additional integration terms, such as certain years of work, language and cultural examinations, documents from the applicants’ countries of origin, are also required, which can act as barriers to entry. Persons applying for naturalisation through other channels, such as refugees or spouses of citizens, face similar requirements. There are also work or income requirements. In more than a dozen European countries, one of the requirements for citizenship is a stable source of income.

After a long wait, Natalia took her exams in 2023 to obtain Greek citizenship, spending money on the necessary documents and hours of endless studying without help. She managed to pass the exams, but her application was rejected as, working as a cleaner, she did not meet the minimum required annual income of 8,450 euros for the relevant period between 2014-2019. “I have been here legally since 1997 and all these years I have been living somehow, right? But not with what was required”, she explains to MIIR in frustration.

It took nine years from Natalia’s initial application to the announcement of the final decision on her citizenship. The corresponding time in Spain and Italy can be as long as ten years, while in Greece it is six years, although the law stipulates that the administration has 12 months to examine applications for naturalisation. There are currently more than 30,000 pending applications in our country.

Natalia, however, decided not to take the exam again, as she is now 61 years old and does not think she will ever be able to meet the income threshold. She will simply try to renew her residence permit, a process that the NGO Generation 2.0 Red estimates may take at least two years. That’s because in 2024, pending residence permit applications for third-country nationals reached 280,474, with about 32,650 new applications added in one year, from November 2023 to November 2024.

As Generation 2.0 Red reports in its latest report on Monitoring Administrative Procedures for Obtaining Citizenship (Report #2, May 2024 – August 2024)), “a key and insurmountable barrier for most applicants is the requirement to prove minimum income, which leads to many application denials. Acquiring citizenship for people who have lived in the country for years and have developed strong ties with it, should not depend on economic factors”.

In Greece in 2023, 4,931 decisions for naturalisation of migrants were issued (latest available data from the General Secretariat for Citizenship), of which 3,515 (71.28%) were positive. The majority of them (73.88%) concerned immigrants from Albania. However, three out of ten applications (1,416 in number) for citizenship were rejected.

Strangers in their own land

There are also thousands of pending citizenship applications in Greece in the case of second-generation immigrants, reaching 18,822 at the end of March 2022 (latest available data), with delays in the processing of applications exceeding four years.

In this case, citizenship is granted, at the request of the parents, either to minor children born in the country and enrolled in the first grade of primary school (strict conditions apply regarding the status and years of residence of their parents in the country), or to minor children who have completed nine grades of primary and secondary education in a Greek school or six grades of secondary education or have a high school diploma and a higher education degree. 

In 2023 the acceptance rate of second generation citizenship applications was 97.3% (7,514 positive decisions), in 2022 98.38% (6,867) and in 2021 97.03% (5,154).

In 2022, Italy and Spain were the two European countries with the highest total number of naturalisations (213,716 and 181,581 respectively) according to Eurostat. However, almost a third of these involve people born there. The proportion is similar in Austria (32.69%), but higher in Greece (53.93%), where more than half of the 12,733 people granted citizenship were born here.

The laws of EU member states tend to favour citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis) rather than by place of birth (jus soli), but several countries allow people born there to become citizens regardless of their parents’ nationality in special cases.

Five countries automatically grant citizenship to people born there to foreign parents who meet certain conditions, according to the Global Citizenship Observatory (Globalcit). Portugal offers citizenship to children born there whose foreign parents have lived there for a year. Ireland does so after three years. Germany does it after five years, from June 2024, while Luxembourg and France automatically grant citizenship to people born there who can prove they have lived in the country for 5 years when they turn 18. In France, more than a quarter of the approximately 114,500 naturalizations in 2022 involved children aged 13 to 17 whose parents filed an application for their naturalisation, despite the provision for automatic citizenship at age 18.

In contrast, fifteen other EU countries do not allow the automatic naturalisation of children born there to foreign parents, but offer simplified procedures, such as reducing the time required for prior legal residence. There is no common rule: while in Spain, parents of children born in the country can apply for their child’s citizenship after one year of legal residence, in Italy they cannot apply until the child turns 18. Sweden requires three years of residence, not only for children born there, but for all minors residing in the country, regardless of their place of birth.

In all these countries, the first barrier to naturalisation is the acquisition of legal residence. “When children are born to parents who are in an irregular situation, they are also in an irregular situation,” explains Diego Fernández-Maldonado, a migration lawyer for the civil society organisation Caritas in Madrid, Spain. Economist Christina Gathmann of the Luxembourg Institute for Socio-Economic Research, calls it a “missed opportunity” that most countries do not recognise birthright citizenship for children of foreign parents: “Europe is falling behind or not thinking about the benefits, because very few countries in Europe have birthright citizenship.”

Stateless and deprived of rights

There is another category of people that nobody talks about. It concerns at least 381,000 foreigners, according to UNHCR figures, living in the EU without official citizenship, a situation that forces them to live as invisible people without basic rights.

Many stateless people come from states that have disappeared or may have been displaced by war or for other reasons. Others have no nationality, because of gaps in the laws of their country of birth: they may be the children of stateless persons or of people whose countries do not recognise as citizens the children born to their citizens abroad. Some people are stateless because the country where they live does not recognise their country of origin as a state, as in much of the European Union (EU) for people from Palestine or Western Sahara.

In Sweden the number of recognised stateless persons increased from 5,300 in 2005, the first year with available data, to 42,511 in 2022. In Greece, the number of stateless persons reached 4,488 in 2022, exactly the same as in 2021.

Since the middle of the last century, two UN conventions have aimed to guarantee minimum rights for stateless persons. First, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, which defines which people fall into this category and requires signatory countries to provide them with access to basic rights that are at least the same as those enjoyed by legally resident foreigners. 

Then there is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which limits the requirements that stateless persons must meet to obtain a nationality. However, France, Greece and Slovenia have not yet ratified the 1961 Convention, and Cyprus, Estonia and Poland have not even acceded to the 1954 Convention, according to the latest report on statelessness by the European Migration Network (EMN), an EU-funded intergovernmental organisation. 

In 2022, according to the latest Eurostat data, the 27 EU countries granted citizenship to a total of 7,296 stateless persons. As of 2013, the first year for which data is available, at least 67,600 stateless persons were granted citizenship, with more than half in Sweden.

Only 18 countries have simplified access to citizenship for stateless people, according to Globalcit. The process, however, varies from country to country and facilitations are not always provided. Ireland does not require stateless persons to have lived in the country for a certain period of time. In Greece, if a stateless person has lived in the country for 3 years, they can apply for citizenship. Belgium reduces the residence requirement from 5 years to 2 years, while 5 years of residence is also the criterion in Germany. Nine other EU countries, including Spain, Portugal and Romania, do not facilitate the acquisition of citizenship for stateless persons.

All EU countries, except Cyprus and Romania, grant citizenship to people born in the country who would otherwise be stateless. In Greece, children born to stateless parents acquire Greek citizenship if they are born in the country.

More obstacles on the path to citizenship

Citizenship acquisition is in any case the only status that recognises the holder as an equal member of society, giving him/her equal access to rights, but also a sense of security that there is no scenario of returning to the country of origin.

At a time when far-right forces are dragging European rulers towards tightening migration policy, it is certain that the challenges of acquiring citizenship will increase in member states. In Greece, the recent landmark decision of the Council of the State, which terminates Turkey’s recognition as a safe third country for refugees of five nationalities (Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Somalia), is expected to increase pressure on an already overburdened administration where, without realistic and systematic solutions, the problems of delays in residence permits and citizenship, instead of being corrected, will worsen, leaving thousands of people in limbo. 

*The cross-border data investigation was conducted as part of the European Data Journalism Network (EDJNet).

The project was coordinated by the Spanish journalism group Civio, with the participation of the following newsrooms: Deutsche Welle (Germany), Noteworthy (Ireland), OBCT (Italy), Dennik N (Slovakia) and MIIR (Greece).

To read more on the methodology of the investigation, please check the boxes on methodology at the end of Civio’s reports: here, here and here. 

Credit: Εuropean Union-EP

• Greece is spending the largest part (37%) of its green-transition money on renewable-energy projects. Only 11% is going to projects that directly address climate change. 
• Of the 172 green milestones and targets, the Greek government has yet to meet 79% of them. 
• To date, disbursements for green investments are stalled at €3 billion, while Greece has access to a total of €14.3 billion in green bonds. 
• Greece’s renewables projects are in trouble due to inadequate planning. A much-postponed study is expected in late 2025. In the meantime, the country risks being hauled before the European Court of Justice for the irregular siting of wind turbines. 
• None of Greece’s projects have involved proper environmental auditing. But Greece is nonetheless betting on the untried technology of carbon capture and storage. 
• The recovery plan’s “no significant harm” principle looks inadequate from an environmental standpoint. 

The term “green investment” has long since lost the prestige it once enjoyed. Renewable-energy installations (wind turbines, solar photovoltaics, etc.) now encounter systematic opposition from Greek country-dwellers. Meanwhile, a pile of money from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) has become available to fund the so-called green transition and promote Europe’s self-sufficiency in energy. So what will this transition involve? And will proper protections be afforded to the local environment?

The European Data Journalism Network (EDJNet) and the Mediterranean Institute for Investigative Reporting (MIIR) have put the European Commission’s own data under the microscope, alongside the national recovery plans of Greece and 10 other countries in southern and eastern Europe. We hope to shed light on the real impact of the projects funded by the EU scheme.

How much of Greece’s allocation is going to climate targets?

The new EU money means different things for different EU countries. For some, the recovery fund represents a unique opportunity to achieve development. This is particularly true for the countries of southern and eastern Europe, which have received the greatest funding in relation to GDP. These include Greece, Croatia, Spain, Romania, Romania, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia. It is why we chose to look at these countries in particular.

All 11 countries examined are meeting the requirement that 37% of their allocation be invested in the green transition. Some exceed it by far. In particular, Hungary devotes 67% of its resources to climate and environmental objectives. Bulgaria, in second place, is also spending more than half (57%) of its funds on green measures, and Slovakia and Poland are close behind with 48% and 47% respectively. Greece is in tenth place with 38%. 

A more detailed breakdown of green-transition spending shows that Greece (together with 4 other countries: Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary) committed the largest share of its money to renewable-energy projects. Four countries (Croatia, Spain, Portugal and Slovakia) targeted energy efficiency measures. Only two countries (Romania and Italy) directed the lion’s share of their money to sustainable transport projects.

It is hard to know with certainty why countries decide to invest more in one target than another. However, we can speculate about their motivations. For example, Poland, Hungary and Lithuania have invested more than half of their allocation in renewable-energy projects. Eurostat figures show that Poland and Hungary in particular rank last among EU countries for renewable-energy consumption. They therefore have an extra incentive to invest in this area in order to comply with existing European targets.

But this is not the case of Greece’s national plan, which nonetheless directs much (37%) of its money to renewables. Based on the same Eurostat statistics, Greece is in the middle of the European pack in terms of renewables with 22.7% (representing the total renewable share for transport, electricity, heating and cooling). The EU-27 average figure is 23%.

So why did Greece choose to invest disproportionately in renewables projects compared to other areas, notably energy efficiency (33%, mainly meaning the renovation of poorly insulated buildings)? And why is it investing so little in climate mitigation and adaptation (only 11%, even though this challenge is a critical concern for Greece) or in transport (3%, despite major deficiencies in Greek cities, especially Athens)?

“The Greek recovery plan was not done properly”, argues Theodota Nantsou, head of environmental policy at WWF Greece. “Where the money should have been channelled, and it was an opportunity, was the Greek building sector. That is, upgrades for energy efficiency, and better insulation of buildings. The climate crisis is coming and it will hit the building stock mercilessly.”

No thermal insulation

Of the approximately 6.5 million residences in Greece, more than half were built before 1980 and so have no thermal insulation. Based on data from Greece’s Ministry of Environment and Energy, 77% of those homes that have been issued energy performance certificates are classified in the three worst classes (E, Z and H), while less than 5% are in the two best classes.

Greece’s national “Save” programme uses the recovery fund’s resources for the thermal renovation of houses, but it is “completely inadequate”, says Nantsou. “It is too little money when Greece has such leaky buildings. This was a huge opportunity to upgrade the building sector so that basements, and old apartment buildings, and houses in villages that depend on coal and fire-burning stoves, are viable.”

The issue of thermal insulation of buildings is critical for another reason: it is inextricably linked to energy poverty, i.e. people’s inability to pay for the electricity and fuel that will keep their homes at tolerable temperatures.

As things stand, heating and cooling can be an expensive luxury for energy-poor Greeks. According to Eurostat data, more than one in three of them (34%) do not live in an adequately cool home during the summer months.

Credit: Freepik

Renewables without proper planning of land use

There is another conundrum at the heart of Greece’s national recovery plan. Despite the large share of investment channelled to renewables projects, local environmental protection has been poor.

Most of the measures included in the Greek plan did include zero-cost commitments to improve the regulatory framework in this or that area. In terms of the green transition, such commitments were “piecemeal and basically intended to benefit renewables”, Nantsou explains. They do not deal with Greece’s longstanding issues of poor land-use planning and environmental regulation.

“Greek renewables are indeed progressing rapidly”, she notes, “but that is because there is sun and wind, and not because the permitting process is good or because of proper land-use planning which tells the investor where and if the wind installation can be built.”

Wind-farm park at Petra Skeli, Crete – Credit: Documentary “Askos tou Aiolou”

Wind farms off the leash

It is for this reason that the EU Commission has an ongoing infringement case against Greece for its uncontrolled siting of wind farms (the procedure is stuck at the consultation stage since February 2023). Greece has no proper land-use plan for renewables, as the existing one is outdated (2008) and does not comply with the EU directive on the protection of Natura sites.

In a routine annual meeting with staff of the Greek environment ministry, Commission officials recently warned that Greece is now likely to be referred to the European Court of Justice “given that the revision of the renewables land-use plan, which should include an examination of cumulative impacts, is postponed from year to year”.

The environment ministry’s most recent such postponement runs till the end of 2025. The tender process for commissioning the study was launched in 2019.

Given this problematic framework for developing renewables, the Greek government added a clause to its recovery plan that will strengthen the regulations for offshore wind farms in particular. The same provision also provides for the “review” and “optimization” of land use for other renewable-energy projects, such as solar panels on agricultural land.

It is no coincidence that in the list of the 100 largest recipients of funding from the European recovery fund, a number of wind and solar operators are prominent, such as Terna Energy, which received the 12th largest grant (€250 million). Among the projects listed on the “Greece 2.0” website, “an electricity storage system crucial for the development of renewables” was prominent, with a budget of €200 million. The list also includes controversial carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects, which will be discussed below.

It is worth noting that this list of the largest recipients was last renewed in November 2023: the Greek government has not adhered to the fund’s requirement to update the list twice a year. Based on the EU Commission’s guidelines, the recipient is considered to be the entity (a company or individual) that receives the fund’s resources directly and is not a contractor. Hence the list contains ministries and public agencies that subsequently contract out the projects, and it does not include all the private contractors that emerge after contracts are awarded. The same applies to the list of projects on the Greece 2.0 site, such as the aforementioned renewable-energy storage systems. For such projects it is nonetheless indicated that a competitive tender procedure will be followed for the contractors.

Credit: Pixabay

No reform of the environmental audit system

At the same time, Greece’s national plan includes no reform of environmental auditing. On this, Nantsou, of WWF, is unequivocal: “There is no serious environmental control in Greece. At the moment, anyone goes where they want and builds what they want, and they know that it will be legalised after a few years. They don’t pay the taxes they should, they don’t make sure they get a building permit as they should, or do the study as they should, or dump the waste water as they should. And then the real cost, the environmental cost, is borne by us all.”

Greece “has not set milestones and targets in order to build a robust control mechanism that is proven to help, as the OECD and the EU have said”, argues Nantsou. “When you have robust control mechanisms, you have a healthier environment, better innovation and healthier economic activity. Such reforms have not been included in the Greek plan.”

Far behind in meeting milestones

Regarding the fulfilment of the 172 milestones and targets and the 71 deadlines featured in Greece’s recovery plan, Greece has so far failed to meet 79% of them. This situation is also true of other countries in the region. Italy and Croatia have only met 25% of them.

€3 billion received so far by Greece for green investments

The total amount disbursed by Greece from the recovery fund for all the pillars of the programme stands at €17.2 billion, according to the Greece 2.0 website. Greece is entitled to receive €36 billion in loans (€17.73 billion) and non-repayable grants (€18.22 billion), which in total represents 16.2% of Greek GDP.

According to the data on NextGenerationEU green bonds (the financial mechanism that feeds the climate-related resources of the Recovery and Resilience Facility), Greece is eligible to receive €14.359 billion, which ranks it 5th among EU countries.

According to EU Commission figures, Greece has so far received a total of €2.84 billion under the green transition facility and an additional €153 million of initial funding under the RePowerEU programme, totalling almost €3 billion. The equivalent figure for Italy is €15.5 billion, with Poland in second place (€7 billion) and Spain third (€6.6 billion).

Carbon capture and storage: a controversial technology

The Greek plan includes carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects. This technology allows carbon dioxide to be captured from factories and power plants, then compressed and stored in repositories in natural geological formations underground. It is controversial and possibly dangerous.

Specifically, the Greek plan provides for “the establishment of a legal framework, a licensing framework and a regulatory framework for carbon capture, usage and storage technologies”. Two specific investments were made: one to provide financial support “for the development of the first CO2 storage facility in Greece” and the second concerning “CO2 transport”.

The first and largest investment relates to a project of the company Energean, which is developing Greece’s first CO2 storage facility. This involves the conversion of “depleted” oil reservoirs in the subsea basin of Prinos near Kavala (northern Greece) into geological repositories. The project has been included in the Produc-E Green action plan, and has a total budget of €300 million. However, the final amount of its subsidy remains unconfirmed, as this particular plan includes different categories of subsidy which encompass the production of electric cars, chargers and batteries, as well as recycling.  

The second investment, under RePowerEU, concerns the construction of a pipeline in the Attica region. This will connect two cement plants to a liquefaction terminal (possibly in Revithoussa), from where the liquefied CO2 emissions will be transported by ship to the storage site in Prinos.

Right from the public-consultation stage, environmental organisations have been opposed to the inclusion of CCS investments. In a comment on the matter, WWF argued that CCS “is extremely costly and offers a questionable and scientifically unproven contribution to climate change mitigation” and that its use is not a “panacea for decarbonising industry and should not be an excuse” for avoiding it.

Nantsou elaborates: “This is essentially a fairy tale of the oil industry. In most cases it is being used as a means of mitigation, to absorb the industry’s own emissions. This way they can continue their polluting activity by burying their emissions.”

CCS is risky since it involves burying the carbon dioxide in rocks under high pressure, a process that can cause dangerous leaks into the subsoil. Although the technology is experimental, this has not stopped industries from requesting exemptions from their obligation to reduce their pollution on the grounds that they will later install CCS.

Worse still, in this case the risks are not limited to those mentioned above. The document accompanying the storage permit for the Prino investment makes clear that the prospective carbon repository is only partially depleted. In its words, “care will be taken to ensure that any potential oil or gas extraction will be limited to the necessary needs to manage pressure and ensure the safety of the storage sites, and any such extraction will only take place if it is necessary for the safe storage of CO2. The CO2, together with any oil or gas that may be extracted, will be separated and returned for permanent storage.”

Credit: Hellenic Hydrocarbons and Energy Resources Management Company (HEREMA)

“No significant harm”: an inadequate principle

According to the technical guidance provided by the EU Commission to the member states, the so-called “no significant harm” principle must be applied to all projects included in national recovery plans. This stipulates that no measure should cause significant harm to existing environmental objectives.

Beyond the obviously ambiguous nature of the term (i.e., the definition of what constitutes significant harm), the Commission has been criticised from the outset by environmental groups for its failure to ensure that the recovery measures are accompanied by environmental protection.

Green10, an umbrella group of ten international environmental organisations, complained in a public statement about the principle’s simplified criteria as presented in the technical guidance. It would appear that the environmental assessments of projects undertaken by each EU country was a simple matter of box-ticking on questionnaires.

After reviewing a number of European projects, Green10 found that “the assessments carried out by member states under the ‘no significant harm’ criterion were of poor quality and would not be effective in preventing environmental harm”.

In particular, “many recovery plans do not contain enough detail to allow for an assessment of their environmental impact”, while some “approved measures do not even specify the exact locations or details, and therefore the measures should not have been approved”. For example, one approved plan included funding for 29 irrigation projects whose locations were not even disclosed! Unfortunately, such cases are not the exception, notes the environmental group. “The assessments provided by member states did not accurately reflect the potential damage of this and other such projects. That will only become apparent later in the process, when the funds have already been disbursed.”

By then it will be too late. The damage will have been done, and the money spent.

*This investigation is part of a cross-border European Data Journalism Network (EDJNet) project, headed by Openpolis, with the participation of MIIR, Dennik N and Eurologus.

Next image credit: European Union-EP